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Summary;
The purpose of this paper is to clarify two misstatements in
Joseph Stiglitz's landmark work, "A Re-Examination of the Modigliani-
Miller Theorem." Although these revisions are essential for the
original paper to stand alone, they do not alter the thrust of
Stiglitz's thesis or his conclusions.

Comments on Stiglitz's Re-Examination
of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem
The purpose of this paper is to isolate two apparent misstatements in
Joseph Stiglitz's landmark paper, "A Re-Examination of the Modigliani-
Miller Theorem." Its intent is not to discredit but clarify. Insertion
of the suggested changes does not alter Stiglitz's conclusions. However,
these inclusions are necessary for the paper to stand by itself.
Since the appearance of Modigliani and Miller's (M&M) classic paper,
legitimate criticisms of their remarkable conclusions have focused on
the validity of their assumptions. Stiglitz enumerates five limitations
of the M&M proof. These are:
"1. It depend (s) on the existence of risk classes.
2. The use of risk classes seem(s) to imply objective rather than
subjective probability distributions over the possible outcomes.
3. It (is) based on partial equilibrixjun rather than general equilib-
rium analysis.
4. It (is) not clear whether the theorem held only for competitive
markets.
5. Except under special circimistances, it (is) not clear how the
possibility of firm bankruptcy affected the validity of the
theorem." [p. 784]
Through a general equilibrium, state preference model, Stiglitz
demonstrates that M&M's Proposition I "... holds under much more gen-
eral conditions than those assumed in their original study. The validity
of the theorem does not depend on the existence of risk classes, on compet-
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itiveness of the capital market, or on the agreement of individuals about
the probability distribution of outcomes." [Stiglitz, p. 784]
Two of M&M's assumptions are critical. These require that all market
participants (firms and individuals) can borrow at the same market rate of
interest, and that there is no risk of bankruptcy. Under a more stringent
set of conditions, the MfiiM results will still be valid even though the exis-
tence of limitations on individual borrowing and/or the possibility of bank-
ruptcy is present. In detailing these more stringent conditions, Stiglitz
has erred.
Limitations on Individual Borrowing
Stiglitz correctly refutes the objection that individuals cannot borrow
at the same rate of interest as firms by emphasizing that individuals need
not "actually borrow from the market but only change their holdings of bonds."
Therefore he continues, "a problem can arise then only if an individual has
no bonds in his portfolio." [p. 787] In equation (9) Stiglitz stipulates
an inequality that constrains all individuals to be lenders.
(9) Z a^.B. > w^ - Z a^.V. Cfor all j)
1 i
where a. = the percentage of the i„ firm's equity owned by the
i individual, E-l/E. ,J * i' 1 '
V = the value of firm i,
E. = the value of the i firm's equity,
B. = the value of the i firm's bonds, and
1 '
w-* = the value of the j individual's wealth.
Clearly then, V. H E. + B.,'ill
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If we assume an environment of 3 individuals (j = a, b, c) and two
firms (i = 1, 2) with market values:
V^ = E^ + B^,
V2 = E2 + B2,
where E , B. > (i = 1, 2),
constraint (9) yields:
for j = a w - a,E^ - ct-E^ £. 2(a^B^ + a^B-),
for j = b w^ - a^E^ - O2E2 f. 2(a^B^ + a2B2) , and
for j = c w^ - a,E. - a^E„ < 2(a^B. + at^,,)
.
xj. wz— ± 1. zz
These inequalities make very little economic sense. Moreover, it is
not intuitively clear why this set describes the necessary and sufficient
conditions for all individuals to be lenders. Equation (9') is a direct
approach that requires all individuals to be lenders.
(9') w^ - S a^E. > (for all i)
This inequality forces the wealth of each individual, w-' , minus the sum
of his equity holdings in each firm, to be positive. Since all wealth is
defined in terms of E. or B-' , the positive difference defined in (9')
must be B-^ . Thus if (9') holds for every (j ) individual, everyone
will own bonds (i.e. will be a lender). We can recast (9') in terms of V.
rather than E. and offset the additional B. terms on righthand side of
(9') as follows:
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(9") w^ - I a^V. > - E a^B^,
.XI
. X i
X X
which expands to
\P - I a^E. - l a^B. > - E ct^B..XX .XX .XXX X
Because the B. terms cancel, (9') and (9'') are identical. Interest-
ingly, (9'') may be transposed to give (9''').
(9'") E a^B. > - [w^ - E a^V.]
.XX .XX
X X
(9) E a^B. > [\^ - E a^V.]
X X — . XX
X X
Equations (9''') and (9) are strikingly similar. It is possible that the
difference results from a typographical error.
To check the suitability of the two formulations we can extend our
simple financial environment consisting of two firms (i =1, 2), three
individuals (j = a, b, c), and market values:
V^ = E^ + B^ and V^ = E2 + B2,
where E., B. > (i = 1, 2). Also assume that:
x' X
a^ = 1/2, a^ = 1/2,
a^ = 1/2, a^ = 1/2,
a^ = 0, a = 0.
If individual a owns 1/2 of B. and individual b owns the remaining 1/2 B^,
this implies:
w^ = 1/2 E^ + 1/2 E2 + 1/2 B^,
w^ = 1/2 E^ + 1/2 E2 + 1/2 B^, and
w*^ = B2.
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Plugging these values into Stiglitz's equation (9) infers:
3
1/2 B + B- >. for j = a (correct),
1/2 B + B- >. for j = b (correct) , and
B„ ^ for j = c (incorrect).
However, if these values are applied to equation (9*"), they yield:
1/2 B > for j = a (correct),
1/2 B > for j = b (correct), and
B- > for j = c (correct)
.
On the other hand, if only individual c own bonds, while individuals a
and b own only equity (in the previous proportions), the following w^
would be appropriate:
w^ = 1/2 E^ + 1/2 E2,
w^ = 1/2 E + 1/2 E2, and
w*^ = B^ + B2.
Stiglitz's eqtiation (9) infers:
B + B^ >_ for j = a (incorrect),
B^ +
^2 ^ for j = b (incorrect), and
B + B„ <_ for j = c (incorrect).
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while (9 ' " ) gives
:
i
> for j = a (correct)
,
> for j = b (correct), and
B. + B„ > for j = c (correct)
.
Thus it appears (9'") is the appropriate constraining condition to insure
that all individuals hold some bonds in a portion of their portfolio.
Mean Variance Analysis and the Separation Theorem in the Presence of
Bankruptcy
In section III, Stiglitz establishes that even if a firm issues enough
bonds to go bankrupt, as long as all individuals agree on the probability
distribution of returns for each firm, the value of that "risky" firm is
independent of its debt equity ratio.
Most treatments of mean-variance analysis focus on rates of return.
Indeed, those familiar with the Sharpe-Lintner capital asset pricing model
(CAPM) should recognize Stiglitz' s assumption as a restatement of the
homogeneous expectations or "idealized" uncertainty requirement. Fama
4details several alternative versions of the CAPM.
(1) e(r^) = r* + S^[e(r^) - r*]
,
[e(r ) - r*] cov(r ,r )
(1») = r* + ? ^ "^
2 *
m
(1") = r* + A cov(r.,r ),
where r. = the rate of return on the ith risky asset (or portfolio),
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r* = the rate of return on a risk-free asset (i.e. the risk-free rate),
r = the rate of return on the market portfolio of risky assets,
cov(r.,r ) = the covariance of return on the i asset with the market return,i' m '
2
a (r ) = the variance of the market return,
m '
B. = cov(r.,rJ/a2(r^),
e(r^) - r*
A =
J
= the market price of risk, and
m
e = the expectations operator.
Instead of focusing on rates of return, Stiglitz (referring to Lintner)
places his emphasis on stock and flow variables (i.e. market values and
"operating" dollar returns or operating income. Although one set of
variables (rates of return) is the mirror image of the other (value and
dollar returns) and vice versa, the transition between variables is not
always smooth. Nevertheless, it should be evident that if Stiglitz 's
presentation is correct, it should collapse into the CAPM.
We will reconstruct Stiglitz 's equations (10) through (12), based
upon Lintner's equations (29) through (29'') because they served as
Stiglitz 's point of embarkation.
(29) V. = (R. - W.)/r*,
_
v
(29') = [R^ - (X/T) Z R^ ]/r*,
J
E(R. - r*V.)
(29") = [R - i l R ]/r*,
IJ
where V. = aggregate market value of firm i,
R. = the expected level of operating income for firm i.
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R. . = the covariance of the operating incomes of firms i and j , and
r* = the risk-free rate.
Stiglitz's equation (10) is a restatement of (29'); however, a more
precise version is (10').
(10) E^ + B^ = Jx - k Z e(X^ - X^)(X. - X.)W r*
r n
(10') V. = E. + B. =
,1 1 1
X^ - k E e[(X^ - X^)(X - X )]^ / r*,
L j=l
where E., B., B., e and r* are as previously defined and
X. = the expected level of operating income for firm i.
Since X. = Lintner's R., we can rewrite (10') as follows;
1 1
(10 '•) V. = ix. - k E X..I / r*.
^ l^ j=l ^']
Comparing (10") with (29') it should be clear that k = X/T.
Stiglitz defines k as:
k = r* [E (X. - X.) / ZZe(X. - X.)(X. - X.)].
However, since E(X. - X.) would equal zero, k would equal zero. It
i
should be evident that this was not Stiglitz 's intent. If this were true,
the market value of every firm would equal the value of its gross dollar
returns capitalized at the risk-free rate. By writing Stiglitz 's variables
into Lintner's structure, we can derive a new k.
E(X. - r*V.)
.1 1
k = ^-- V
EEX.
.
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Z(X. - r*V.)
.1 X
1
EEe[(X. - X.)(X. - X.)]
the excess dollar retiirns (flows) of the market (excess
above the risk-free rate times the aggregate market value
of all firms comprising the market)
the variance of the dollar market return
Substituting this new k into (10') yields a close surrogate for Lintner's
original equation (29).
(2) V^ = (X^ - n^) I r*,
2:(X - r*V ) E e[(X - X ) (X - X )]
where fi. = "^
1
VL e [(X. - X.)(X. - X.)]
ij ^ ^ ^
Multiplying Q.. by 1/SV ZV, / 1/ZV ZV. does not change its value;
^ i J y i "-j ^
however, it transforms dollar flows (X, and X.) into rates of return
(r
. and r
.
) • This procedure yields
:
[e(r ) - r*] Z e[(X. - X.)(r. - 7.)]
"-j_ ~ J •
ZZ e [(r - 7 )(r -7 )]
ij 1 1 J J
A closer inspection of ^. shows that
and
Z e [(X. - X^)(r - r )] = cov(X.,r^),
J
ZZ e [(r - r )(r - r )] = cov(r ,r )
ij 1 1 J J - "^ "»
m
Inserting these terms into (2) gives
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[e(r ) - r*]cov(X, ,r )
By dividing both sides of (2') by V. and cross-multiplying, we obtain
[e(r ) - r*]cov(r ,r )
. . V m 1 m
r* = e(r.) -
m
or e(r.) = r* + 6.[e(r ) - r*]
,
— X 1 m
cov(r ,r )
where
m
which is of course identical to (1). Thus, the reformulation of k must
be correct.
Conclusions
This paper has isolated two revisions required for exactness and
rigor. The first is a reformulation of Stiglitz's equation (9). The
second restates a variable, k, utilized in equations (10) through (12).
Although the corrections are essential for the original paper to stand
alone, they do not alter the thrust of Stiglitz's thesis or his conclusions.
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FOOTNOTES
Proposition I states "... the market value of any firm is independent
of its capital structure and is given by capitalizing its expected return
at the rate p, appropriate to its risk class" . . . "the average cost
of capital to any firm is completely independent of its capital structure
and is equal to the capitalization rate of a pure equity stream of its
class." [Modigliani & Miller, p. 268]
2
The superscript refers to individuals; the subscript pertains to firms.
3
This remark refers to the constraint's suitability and accuracy in
describing the given financial environment. For example. If each individual
in our hypothetical environment owns bonds, the constraint must describe
a feasible condition for every individual. On the other hand, if the
environment has an individual who owns no bonds, the constraint must
describe an infeasible condition for at least one individual.
4
Admittedly a precise statement of equations (1-1'') would include com-
plementary random error terms. Fortunately for our purposes, the assump-
tions of the model (see Fama, pp. 37-AO) obviate this requirement.
Conventionally, "operating income" is income before financial charges.
Stiglitz uses the term gross returns, i.e. the dollar return before paying
bondholders but after paying all non-capital factors of production.
As a general rule rates of return are represented as lowercase letters;
values and dollar flows are uppercase letters.
This, of course, assumes that X. is a normally distributed random
variable.
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